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Introduction
The term ‘British interregnum’, in relation to Indonesia, refers to two short 
periods in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when the British 
took control of most of the Netherlands Indies from the Dutch, only to hand it 
back a few years later. The British did this as a result of their wars with France. 
The first occupation occurred in 1795-1797 after a pro-France regime had been 
established in Holland. After peace was declared in 1802, the occupied territo-
ries were returned to the Dutch. Hostilities soon resumed, however, and with 
the annexation of Holland by the French in 1810, the British once more moved 
into the Netherlands Indies. Following France’s defeat in Europe, the Dutch 
territories were restored once again in 1816. This paper deals with British rule 
in Timor, one of the far-flung outposts of the Netherlands Indies, and the cen-
tral role played by a native of that island, Jacobus Arnoldus Hazaart, in helping 
the British administer the territory. Hazaart’s name looms large in the colonial 
history of Netherlands Timor due to the long period he spent at the helm of the 
territory’s government and his many and varied efforts to improve the security 
and well-being of its inhabitants. Although Hazaart played no role in the first, 
unsuccessful, British occupation of Timor, that story is told here also.
Considering Timor’s reputation in the colonial era as a poor and isolated 
outpost, there has been a surprising amount written about it. Most of what 
has been written about Hazaart and the Netherlands Timor of his day is 
based on Dutch journal articles published in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Some of these articles provide details not given elsewhere, but most 
seem to be derived from a single article published in 1847, ‘Bijdragen tot 
de geschiedenis van het eiland Timor’ (Contributions to the history of the 
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island Timor), written by G. Heijmering, a clergyman with the Nederlandsch 
Zendelinggenootschap (Dutch Protestant Missionary Society). Heijmering 
(1847:198-9, 204-5) claims that many details of events at Timor were missing 
from official records and that some previously published reports were unreli-
able, but that through his interviews with ‘living eyewitnesses’, all ‘truthful 
people’, he was able to place events ‘in their true light’. One has no reason to 
doubt that Heijmering’s informants were indeed ‘truthful people’, but the fact 
that they are used as the authority for events spanning a period of nearly fifty 
years is a signal for caution in accepting their testimony, as memory can be 
fallible. Heijmering’s article contains information that is not found elsewhere, 
and will remain important, but other sources do exist, which in some cases 
confirm Heijmering’s findings, and in others call them into doubt. This paper 
builds on the foundation provided by Heijmering, by drawing on published 
material that has been overlooked by other authors, and primary sources 
discovered in archives and libraries in Jakarta, London and The Hague. 
These sources are at times at odds with each other and contain some palpable 
errors, but taken together they make it possible to provide a more detailed 
(although still far from complete) picture of Hazaart and the role he played 
during the period of British rule in his homeland.
The first British occupation
The first British occupation of the Netherlands Indies had been a relatively 
painless affair. Malacca, Padang, Ambon and the Bandas were occupied after 
only slight resistance. Ternate held out for several years, but capitulated in 
1801.1 The only Dutch post to successfully oppose British occupation was Ku-
pang, in Timor. As B.H.M. Vlekke (1946:130) puts it, ‘On Timor a success was 
scored when the local commander with the help of armed slaves and tribes-
men drove the British from the fortress of Kupang, which they had occupied’. 
Vlekke’s statement is only partly true.
According to Heijmering (1847:196-9), the British arrived off Kupang with 
a ship of the line and a corvette from Maluku in early June 1797. The British 
had long been expected, but the town was poorly defended and the general 
consensus was that opposition would be futile. Mr Wanjon, the opperhoofd 
(headman)2 of the settlement, therefore considered it prudent to make as 
advantageous a capitulation to the British as possible, thereby ensuring that 
1 Parkinson 1954:136; Vlekke 1946:130. Java was not occupied at this time, but was subject to a 
naval blockade.
2 In British reports the government heads of different islands in the Indies are often referred to 
as ‘governor’, although the Dutch were more likely to refer to these people merely as opperhoofd. 
When Hazaart assumed leadership in Kupang his official title was drost, bailiff or sheriff. Under 
the British he became the ‘resident’, a title later commonly used by the Dutch also.
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the inhabitants and their property would go unmolested. Wanjon’s second-
in-command, Mr Greeving, however, was totally opposed to a capitulation, 
due, it was said, to the fact that his books were not in good order. These were 
the last days of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC, Dutch East 
India Company) administration in the Netherlands Indies and corruption 
was rife, so presumably Greeving feared detection of his own misdoings. 
Because of Greeving’s opposition to surrender, Wanjon sought and received 
a delay from the British to hold a meeting of the leading European inhabitants 
of the settlement. Having gathered these worthies, Wanjon presented each 
with a piece of paper on one side of which was written the word capituleren 
(capitulate), and on the other side, vechten (fight). Wanjon asked each to sign 
his name under his choice of action. As Greeving was the only one who 
voted to fight, Kupang was surrendered to the British on 10 June 1797, but 
before that happened Greeving arranged for the Company’s trade goods to be 
removed from the warehouse in the fort (Heijmering 1847:199-200). This act 
may have been the catalyst for later events as, according to an author known 
only as B. (1852:220), Greeving became increasingly concerned that the British 
would discover his theft and was determined to drive them away. 
According to a British account written by C.N. Parkinson, based on India 
Office and Admiralty records, Kupang was occupied by a small garrison, 
mainly sepoys (Indian soldiers), under Lieutenant Frost. Coming from a 
meeting with the Dutch ‘governor’ (presumably Wanjon), Frost saw two of 
his sentries being killed by armed Timorese. Frost and two survivors then ran 
to the captured Fort Concordia, but found that it offered little sanctuary, as 
they came under heavy musket fire from nearby buildings that overlooked 
the fort. Assisted by a group of marines, Frost and the others escaped back to 
the ships, where it was decided to set fire to the town and blow up the fort 
(Parkinson 1954:136). 
The account told to Heijmering was little different, barring that Frost 
assumed the Timorese attack was part of a general Dutch conspiracy 
(Parkinson 1954:136), whereas Heijmering’s informants put the blame solely 
on Greeving. According to this account, the day after the surrender many 
of the British officers and soldiers were seen roaming the town or in their 
quarters with local inhabitants. All was peaceful, but Greeving had secretly 
persuaded the local contingent of Mardijkers (non-European soldiers in VOC 
employ) and a number of Timorese from the surrounding district to attack 
and kill the British. Wild bands descended on the settlement and murdered 
the British soldiers in the presence of their hosts. Their severed heads were 
carried off into the interior and only a handful of the British soldiers were 
able to reach the safety of their ships (Heijmering 1847:200).
Heijmering (1847:198-201) was told that Wanjon, fearing he would be held 
responsible by the British, fled from Kupang, followed by the majority of the 
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European inhabitants. The British then bombarded the town with their ships’ 
cannons. The fort was badly damaged, as were many of the private residenc-
es, but the Chinese inhabitants suffered the most, as their dwellings directly 
bordered the seafront. Following this, the British weighed anchor, leaving the 
smoking ruins of Kupang in the distance, only for the place to be plundered 
by the Timorese, who descended on the town in their hundreds. 
A. Haga (1882:288-9) states that Greeving later appeared in Batavia with 
a British prisoner of war and was greeted by the government as a hero, but 
when Wanjon was called to give his side of the story, doubts began to sur-
face. Haga cites Wanjon’s report on the matter, which basically concurs with 
Heijmering’s account, but Haga concludes, as did apparently the govern-
ment, that the full truth of the case was unlikely to be revealed.
The various accounts highlight different aspects of the first British occu-
pation of Kupang, but all agree that the British were only forced to abandon 
their occupation at a high cost to the local population. The British claim to 
have lost sixteen of their sepoys and seamen in the mêlée, but to have killed 
three hundred of the ‘rebels’ in return (Parkinson 1954:136). The town was 
largely destroyed and much property looted. It was, thus, hardly the ‘success’ 
described by Vlekke.3
The appointment of J.A. Hazaart
Following the brief 1797 British occupation of Kupang, the settlement had 
a rapid succession of leaders, most of whom appear to have been incompe-
tent, corrupt, or unwilling.4 The Director of Finances, Mr Vekens, who recom-
mended to Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels that Jacobus Arnol-
dus Hazaart, a merchant and former lieutenant on one of the VOC’s ships, be 
appointed to the post, finally solved the difficulty of finding a suitable person 
3 French explorer Nicolas Baudin visited Kupang in 1801 and was told that the English had 
captured the fortress ‘last year’, but they were eventually ‘obliged to evacuate it by night’, following 
a ‘war’ with ‘the local natives’. G.L.D. de Rienzi mentions English soldiers being massacred by 
‘half-castes’ (metisse) during an attack on Netherlands Timor in 1801. Both accounts sound similar 
to the 1797 events, which are not mentioned by either. See Baudin 1974:255; Rienzi 1836:209.
4 There were at least six opperhoofden between Wanjon and Hazaart, according to Heijmering. 
At first Greeving was appointed, but was replaced by Commissioner Doser, who was recalled 
due to incompetence. Doser was replaced by Mr Lofsteth, followed by Mr Giesler, both of whom 
died in office and were later discovered to have misused VOC funds. Mr Van Kruine then took 
command, but was replaced by Mr Stopkerb, who requested discharge from the post soon after 
he was appointed. P.J. Veth and B. give Van Kreunen, rather than Van Kruine, and Matthew 
Flinders, who visited Kupang in November 1803, stated that Mr Viertzen was in command, 
having replaced the recently deceased Giesler. J. de Roo van Alderwerelt lists the opperhoofden for 
this period as: F. Wanjon, Greving, J. Doser, Lofsteth, J. Giesler, P.B. van Kruine and P. Stopkeert. 
See Heijmering 1847:202-4; Veth 1855:83; B. 1852:221; Flinders 1966:348; Alderwerelt 1904:224.
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to head the settlement (Heijmering 1847:204-5). Heijmering states that Hazaart 
took over the post in 1809, but Haga (1882:290) cites documents showing that 
Hazaart replaced his predecessor, Mr Stopkerb, on 11 April 1810. Hazaart was 
then 37 years of age and he held the position until at least 1833, just a few 
years before his death.5 There was a period during the third British occupa-
tion when Hazaart was not the official head of government, but even then his 
advice proved invaluable to his replacements, who generally had no knowl-
edge of either Timor or its inhabitants. 
Hazaart was a native of Kupang, and a ‘coloured man’, a fact, says P.J. 
Veth (1855:83), that first caused Vekens to hesitate recommending him for the 
post, although he knew of his abilities. Hazaart objected to his nomination, 
but Daendels approved the appointment and he accepted the post. Hazaart 
applied to Daendels for instructions and received the revealing reply, ‘Adapt 
yourself to the circumstances on Timor and then write to me how things are 
going. We know too little of the outer possessions to give appropriate and 
definite directions for your administration.’ (Heijmering 1847:205.) Hazaart 
thus had to use his own judgement, but he proved to be a capable, energetic 
and loyal official.
When Hazaart was appointed commander of Netherlands Timor in 1810, 
the territory was subordinate to Ambon, but there was little contact between 
the two. The VOC had ceased to exist from the beginning of 1800 and its 
territorial possessions became the property of the Netherlands government. 
Marshal Daendels was appointed governor-general of the Netherlands Indies 
in 1808 and energetically set out to fortify Java against any British attack. The 
British, however, first paid attention to some of the outer islands. In February 
1810 they attacked Ambon, and several days of fighting ensued during which 
the Dutch positions suffered heavy bombardment from the British cannons. 
On 19 February the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Filz, agreed to a 
capitulation. In April, Filz was sent to Java, but was tried and shot soon after 
his arrival, by order of Governor-General Daendels (Thorn 1993:350-4). The 
following year the British turned their attention to Timor.
Hazaart and the defeat of the second British occupation
Hazaart later told Heijmering (1847:206) that the fate of Filz made him de-
termined not to allow a surrender of Kupang without a strenuous defence 
beforehand. Hazaart soon had the chance to prove his mettle when the British 
once more landed in Kupang and took possession of Fort Concordia. Heijmer-
ing prefaces his account of these events by stating that he learnt of them di-
5 Heijmering (1847:230) gives Hazaart’s date of birth as 8 January 1773 and the date of his death 
as 19 December 1838. 
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rectly from Hazaart and other eyewitnesses. He dismisses an earlier account, 
written by Pieter Mijer (1839), because it did not tally with what he was told 
by the participants themselves. Documents exist that support most of Hei-
jmering’s claims, but contradict others, even in such fundamental matters as 
when the occupation occurred.
Heijmering (1847:205-6) states that the second British occupation of Kupang 
happened in June 1810. If this was so, one wonders how Hazaart was able to 
hear of the fate of Filz so quickly, as Timor had only infrequent contact with 
Java.6 Mijer (1839:179), however, puts the date as April 1811. It seems clear 
that Mijer got his information about the brief British occupation from a report 
that appeared in the Bataviasche Koloniale Courant of 15 June 1811. This report 
is quoted at length by Haga (1882:291). The Courant’s dating of the event is 
backed by none other than Hazaart himself in his report to the governor-gen-
eral, dated 15 May 1811. A copy of this report exists in the British Library in 
an English translation that was probably made after the occupation of Java.7 
In his report Hazaart states that the frigate Phoenix under the command of 
Captain James Bowen (Brown, in Heijmering’s account) arrived off Kupang 
undetected during the night and landed a force at Namosain, just to the west 
of the fort, at four o’clock in the morning of 8 April 1811. The British attacked 
a man who questioned who they were, and he later died of his wounds. At 
5.00 a.m. about a hundred British servicemen stormed the fort and met with 
no resistance, because as the British were entering over one wall, the fort 
guards were escaping over another. Hazaart later learnt that his men could 
do little to prevent the occupation of the fort, as their muskets were useless, 
their sergeant-major having removed their cartridges.8 
Sergeant-Major J.L. Euvard9 was a Frenchman who, according to Hazaart, 
acted as a guide for the enemy, taking them to Hazaart’s house to search 
for ‘the lady’ (presumably Hazaart’s wife), who Bowen ordered to be taken 
aboard his ship. She was not found. Euvard then took them to the house of 
the widow of the former opperhoofd van Este, in order to plunder her goods. 
The British captured Hazaart’s secretary, Karel Lamberts, and forced him to 
open the treasury, even though he told them there was no money. They also 
required him to open the stores and supply them with arak, and to take them 
6 When the British occupied Kupang in January 1812, Hazaart is reported to have claimed that 
he had had no communication with Java for nearly two years. See Marshall 1833:59. I am grateful 
to Michael Phillips, who runs the website Sailing ships of the Royal Navy (www.cronab.demon.
co.uk), for bringing this source to my attention.
7 Where Heijmering got the specific date of June 1810 from is a mystery, but Haga (1882:290) 
notes that he was not the first to make the claim. Heijmering’s account is definitely a description 
of the 1811 events, but perhaps there had been an attempted occupation the year before also. 
8 J. Hazaart to Governor General and Council of the Government of the Possessions of his Majesty 
the King of Holland in India, 15 May 1811, Mss Eur Mack Private 29, in British Library, London.
9 Recorded also as Euvrad, Euverhard and Everhard.
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to Hazaart’s house to retrieve the government papers stored there. Lamberts 
was then sent with a message for Hazaart, ordering him to return to the fort 
to meet with Bowen, who assured Hazaart that he wished merely to ‘treat 
with him about all that concerned the Government’ and that the place would 
then be given up and none of the government’s or the inhabitants’ property 
would be taken. But Hazaart learnt that Bowen had broken his word and his 
men were already looting the houses in the town, so, relying on an existing 
defence plan, he assembled all the soldiers, citizens, and local Timorese he 
could gather for a counter-attack.10 
Curiously, Hazaart is silent in his report of what happened next, but accord-
ing to Heijmering (1847:206-8) he had raced on horseback to the nearby district 
of Amabi, where he recruited several hundred native marksmen and returned 
to Kupang with them. The British were then sniped at from behind rocks and 
trees, and by occupying the high ground above the fort, Hazaart and his men 
were able to shoot directly into it. The British attempted to drag some of the 
fort’s cannons into the street to use against their attackers, but many men were 
shot down and the attempt was abandoned. Using cannons from within the 
fort, the British caused great devastation to the town, but were unable to stop 
the hidden riflemen, who continued to inflict carnage in the fort.
Hazaart resumes his report at the British retreat. Before the break of day, he 
says, the British secretly abandoned Fort Concordia and made their way back 
to their ship. They had suffered heavy losses, with at least twenty killed and 
eight severely wounded. A further three had been taken prisoner.11 Heijmering 
(1847:208) adds that it was fortunate for Hazaart that the British did not know 
that he and his men had almost depleted their only keg of powder and had 
been forced to fashion their bullets from any lead available, including window 
frames from Hazaart’s house. Hazaart, however, wrote to Bowen a few months 
after the occupation telling him that the British had occupied the fort for sev-
enteen hours, but that if he had known they had only one ship, he would 
have removed them far sooner. In fact, he maintained that as he had gathered 
over 9,000 enraged natives, he could have ended the occupation in a quarter 
of an hour.12 This seems to be a deliberate exaggeration aimed at deterring the 
British from a further attempted occupation, as Heijmering (1847:207) was told 
that Hazaart had gathered ‘some hundreds’ of natives, while the Bataviasche 
Koloniale Courant put the figure at five hundred (Haga 1882:291). 
10 J. Hazaart to Governor General and Council of the Government of the Possessions of his Majesty 
the King of Holland in India, 15 May 1811, Mss Eur Mack Private 29, in British Library, London.
11 J. Hazaart to Governor General and Council of the Government of the Possessions of his Majesty 
the King of Holland in India, 15 May 1811, Mss Eur Mack Private 29, in British Library, London. 
Both the Bataviasche Koloniale Courant and Heijmering give British casualties as thirty men.
12 J. Hazaart to Governor General and Council of the Government of the Possessions of his Majesty 
the King of Holland in India, 5 June 1811, Mss Eur Mack Private 29, in British Library, London.
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Furthermore, as Hazaart is silent in his report about what happened 
between the time he went to gather reinforcements and the retreat of the 
British, it is unclear whether the dramatic action detailed by Heijmering ever 
took place. Heijmering’s account is confirmed byB. (1852), who would appear 
to have been a military man long acquainted with Timor, but as his work was 
published a few years after Heijmering’s, one cannot be sure that he did not 
simply paraphrase the earlier article. According to the Bataviasche Koloniale 
Courant, after Hazaart’s departure the British ‘plundered and stripped bare’ 
the houses of the inhabitants, which so embittered the local Timorese that 
they attacked the British and drove them from the fort and town without 
Hazaart’s help or guidance. When Hazaart returned to Kupang with his 
reinforcements, he was just a moment too late to prevent the British escape 
(Haga 1882:291). This is also a contested issue. In his report, Hazaart says 
that after the British had retreated to their ship he was able to re-enter the 
fort, but as the guns had all been spiked and the powder expended, he was 
unable to inflict any damage on the Phoenix and the British sailed that night.13 
Years later he apparently told Heijmering (1847:209) that when he entered the 
fort the Phoenix was still at anchor below him. The British had not spiked the 
guns properly and neglected to render the remaining ammunition unusable, 
so he was able to quickly have two cannons loaded and trained onto the ship. 
Just as he was about to blast the Phoenix, however, he reflected that he had no 
means to transport to Java any prisoners of war he should take, so he let them 
escape. It is now impossible to determine which version is correct.
Both Hazaart’s report and Heijmering’s account, however, are in agree-
ment that when the British sailed that night they took Sergeant-Major Euvard 
with them. Hazaart wrote to Captain Bowen on 5 June 1811 that Euvard had 
returned to Kupang in a small vessel on 1 May.14 He had with him a letter from 
Bowen dated 12 April and a parcel containing twelve pairs of silver spoons 
and forks, four pairs of iron forks with silver handles, a copper fork, a tin 
soup spoon, and a pair of shoe buckles set with crystal. Hazaart had Euvard 
imprisoned and wrote Bowen an angry reply. Bowen claimed that the expedi-
tion had aimed to take from Kupang only the goods of the ‘Dutch company’15 
and not those of the inhabitants, hence the kitchenware and shoe buckles 
were returned. Hazaart dubbed Bowen the ‘plunder commander’ and told 
him the items he had returned were trivial considering the 40,000 rix dollars16 
worth of other goods and slaves that had been taken away on the Phoenix. All 
13 J. Hazaart to Governor General and Council of the Government of the Possessions of his Majesty 
the King of Holland in India, 15 May 1811, Mss Eur Mack Private 29, in British Library, London.
14 The date of Euvard’s return is rendered as ‘1st instant’ in both Hazaart’s report of May and his 
letter of June.
15 Although the VOC had ceased to exist from the beginning of 1800, British report writers per-
sisted in referring to the Netherlands Indies government for many years after as the ‘Company’.
16 One rix dollar, or rijksdaalder, was equal to two and a half guilders.
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of these, he said, belonged to private citizens, but he did not think it worth 
spoiling any more paper to speak of them further. Bowen had also com-
plained of Hazaart’s ‘bloody and unexpected attack’, to which he replied that 
he was merely doing his duty. Moreover, he said that the Timorese had been 
so enraged by the insolence of the British that they would have maltreated 
any prisoners taken if not for his presence.17 Bowen clearly did not impress 
Hazaart, but his dealings with the British had just begun.
The third British occupation
Hazaart had managed to drive away the British in April 1811, but in Septem-
ber of that year Governor-General Jan Willem Janssens in Java capitulated to 
the British and surrendered the outer islands also. From the various accounts 
that exist it is clear that Hazaart would have found it difficult to prevent the 
British taking Timor again. The fort was largely in ruins, there was no powder 
for the guns, and no money to pay the soldiers and officers of the garrison 
(Hazaart 1811a). B. (1852:221) reports that when Hazaart first assumed com-
mand of the settlement he expropriated 1,200 rix dollars, meant for poor relief, 
from the treasury, to pay off the military, but he apparently received no more 
money, and morale in the ranks must have been very low. It was not until 10 
January 1812, however, that the British arrived in Timor, and then only by ac-
cident. Captain Charles Thruston (Ternton, in Heijmering’s account)18 on the 
Hesper had been sailing in the Straits of Bali when a combination of currents 
and monsoon winds carried him to Timor and the settlement of Kupang. The 
Dutch colours were flying over the fort, so Thruston sent an officer ashore with 
a flag of truce to inform the ‘governor’ of the capitulation and to demand that 
the British flag replace the Dutch one. In his own account, Thruston says that 
Hazaart appeared to be agitated by this information and hesitated to reply, 
leading Thruston to threaten to attack the settlement if he did not get a favour-
able answer within ten minutes. This was a case of bluff, as most of Thruston’s 
men were far too ill to have caused much harm. Thruston was apparently a 
master of this type of deception, as he dispatched a man to the fort with a Brit-
ish flag while Hazaart pondered his course of action and had him pretend that 
Hazaart had ordered him there. The flag was run up the flagpole and at this 
point Hazaart acquiesced. Thruston then appointed him provisional ‘vice-gov-
ernor’. Thruston did not carry any official documents to prove the capitulation 
in Java had actually taken place, but he felt that Hazaart was totally convinced 
17 J. Hazaart to Governor General and Council of the Government of the Possessions of his 
Majesty the King of Holland in India, 15 May 1811; J. Hazaart to James Brown, Castle Concordia, 
5 June 1811, Mss Eur Mack Private 29, in British Library, London.
18 In some British accounts his name is given as Thurston, but this appears to be an alternative 
rendering of the name.
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of the matter. The Hesper remained in Kupang for weeks and no other ves-
sel arrived to confirm the news. Thruston heard that many people in Kupang 
doubted his story and suspected the truth about the sickly state of his men. 
He also heard that there was a conspiracy between the Dutch and the local 
rajas to take him prisoner and restore the Dutch flag. Thruston put an end to 
this by putting Hazaart under house arrest and placing all his available men 
in the fort. The Hesper was then brought broadside with the town, so that if 
needed her cannons could cause great devastation. The principal inhabitants 
were then summoned and told to prepare the next day to swear an oath of al-
legiance to the British Crown. Thruston’s tactics worked and Hazaart, his staff, 
four local rajas, and other principal inhabitants of the town gathered at the sol-
emn ceremony the following morning. A ball and supper were held that night 
that Thruston thought went so well that he had no further fear of revolt. The 
‘chief of the princes’ became quite drunk and emotional, embracing Thruston 
and declaring his willingness to follow him through the world. Not long after, 
a Chinese junk touched at Kupang and confirmed the Dutch capitulation. In 
late February the Hesper returned to Java (Marshall 1833:55-63).
Hazaart told a different story when he wrote on 7 June 1812 to the Civil 
Commissioner in Makassar, Richard Phillips, who was now responsible for 
Timor also. Hazaart (1812) said that when he learnt of the French annexation 
of the Netherlands he had the Dutch flag ‘turned about’, in which position it 
remained until the settlement was handed over to the British. As Thruston had 
arrived by accident he carried no legal documents to explain the changes that 
had occurred in Java, but Hazaart nevertheless accepted his word of honour 
and the British flag was run up the flagpole on 11 January and on 20 February 
all the members of the government and inhabitants of the town swore allegiance 
to the British Crown. Hazaart later told Heijmering that he feared a stubborn 
refusal to change the flag could have had disadvantageous consequences, so he 
made a deal with Thruston whereby they drew up a contract in which Hazaart 
agreed to change the flags, but that as soon as he heard the British flag no lon-
ger flew over Java he would replace it with the Dutch one, no matter wherever 
else it remained in the Indies. At the ceremony where the flags were exchanged 
Hazaart experienced ‘strained emotions’ to see the Dutch flag lowered on a site 
it had flown over for more than 150 years, and remembering how Bowen’s men 
had been repulsed the previous year he exclaimed to Thruston, ‘You had the 
Dutch flag last year, but bravely defended, Sir!’ (Heijmering 1847:211). 
Hazaart replaced
While there may be some contention over how the surrender occurred, what 
is not disputed is that Thruston asked Hazaart to remain in charge of the ad-
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ministration on behalf of the British. Heijmering (1847:211) says that Hazaart 
soon declared that he was not disposed to continue as British resident and was 
replaced in the course of the following year. If so, Hazaart must have told this 
to Thruston before he left Kupang because his replacement, a Dutchman em-
ployed in British service, C.W. Knibbe, arrived on 22 March 1812, only a few 
weeks after Thruston’s departure.19 As Thruston left Kupang to return to Java 
and Knibbe appears to have arrived from Makassar, it seems most likely that 
Knibbe was already on his way to accept the capitulation of Timor, unaware 
of Thruston having been there before him.20 However it occurred, Knibbe’s 
subsequent correspondence with Makassar provides much information about 
general conditions in Timor at that time that are missing from most sources. 
Thus we learn from Knibbe that expenses in Timor exceeded revenue, all of 
which came from tax farming. Concessions for tax collection were sold to pre-
dominantly Chinese tenderers in the fields of gambling, import and export, 
export of spirits, and the stamping of candles and dammar (tree resin). Tax 
farms for a slaughter tax and poll tax were sold also. Knibbe envisaged more 
revenue would be raised through trade, and reported sandalwood, wax and 
jewellery among the goods seized from the Dutch on his arrival. There was no 
cash and a lack of rice, gunpowder and lead. These items he requested, as well 
as new muskets, as those he found at Kupang were unfit for service. Knibbe 
reported that the native ‘princes’ provided no money to the government, but 
were always willing to provide assistance, leading Knibbe to supply them 
with ammunition following their offer to help fight ‘one of the most remark-
able Princes’, the ‘war-faring rebel at Amanoebang’ (Amanuban), of whom 
Knibbe said the government had always to be careful.21 It was not long before 
the British felt that action had to be taken against this ‘rebellious prince’, but 
not during the time of Knibbe’s administration. The only challenge to the Brit-
ish administration that Knibbe had to report came from the Portuguese.
The relationship between the Dutch in West Timor and their colonial rivals, 
the Portuguese in East Timor, had never been an easy one. Both claimed pos-
session of a number of districts in the region. One of those disputed districts 
was Maubara, on the north coast of present-day East Timor. The rulers of 
Maubara had signed a contract of alliance with the VOC in 1759, but the 
19 Lieutenant Commanding at Coupang, C.W. Knibbe, to Civil Commissioner at Makassar, 
Richard Phillips, 28 March 1812, in Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Algemeene 
Secretarie, Arsip Timor, 1616-1890, no. 21.
20 This is evident from Knibbe’s letters to Makassar and can also be inferred from reports written 
by the Lieutenant Governor of Java, Thomas Stamford Raffles, who wrote in April 1812 that 
Timor had been garrisoned from Makassar. See Raffles to Minto, Ryswick, 17 April 1812, Collectie 
215, 1810-1814 Raflles-Minto Manuscript Collection, Vol 2, in Nationaal Archief, The Hague.
21 Lieutenant Commanding at Coupang, C.W. Knibbe, to Civil Commissioner at Makassar, 
Richard Phillips, 28 March 1812, 3 May 1812, and 6 June 1812, in Arsip Nasional Republik 
Indonesia, Jakarta, Algemeene Secretarie, Arsip Timor, 1616-1890, no. 21.
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Portuguese claimed the territory as well. Yet it seems that neither side did 
much to make good their claims. Knibbe reported that he had appointed a 
Dutchman, Andries Christian Muller, as interpreter to travel to a number of 
areas to inform the local people of the change from Dutch to British control. In 
Oecusse, in April 1812, Muller met a former Portuguese post commander who 
told him that the Portuguese would soon take the islands of Sabu and Rote and 
that the British would hand over Kupang within three months. Muller was then 
en route to Maubara, but he was told that Maubara was Portuguese, not British, 
and that he should not go there. The Portuguese commander of Batugade, near 
the central border of the two territories, repeated this advice. This man warned 
the Chinese captain of Muller’s ship that if he took Muller to Maubara his ves-
sel and cargo would be confiscated and his head chopped off. The Batugade 
commander pointed to the Portuguese flag and exclaimed, ‘Look there, what a 
flag this is!’ He then pointed to the British flag on the ship, and expressed his 
disdain by saying, ‘This is good to wipe our backside and no more.’ Muller’s 
captain would not risk the trip to Maubara and they returned to Kupang.22
Knibbe later reported that he intended to send an interpreter to a number 
of other districts, including Amarasi and the islands of Solor, Sabu and Rote. 
Charles Boxer (1960:354-5) reports that the Glatton visited Solor and left a 
British flag there as a sign of sovereignty, but it seems that the British did little 
else to make good their claims, as it is said that the Portuguese governor of East 
Timor promptly had the British flag removed and obtained formal recognition 
of Portuguese suzerainty from the island’s local ruler. The Portuguese did not 
formally renounce their claim to Solor until 1851 (Heyman 1895:34-5).
In the meantime, the Frenchman Euvard remained under arrest in Kupang, 
and Hazaart and others convinced Knibbe that he was a dangerous man, 
resulting in his being sent to Java as a prisoner.23 Little more of note seems to 
have occurred during Knibbe’s term as resident, but Heijmering (1847:211-2) 
relates an incident in which Knibbe was forced to retreat into the fort by a 
mob of angry Sabunese after attempting to arrest one of them as a thief.24 B. 
22 C. Lamberts, Statements from ‘tolk’ A. Muller and Chinese trader/captain, 1812 in Arsip Na-
sional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Algemeene Secretarie, Arsip Timor, 1616-1890, no. 21. Who 
ruled in Maubara was not settled for many years. In 1837 two ‘English nationals’ were killed 
there, and when a British naval officer complained about this to the Netherlands Indies govern-
ment there was uncertainty over whether the territory was Dutch or Portuguese. The issue was 
only settled in 1851, when the Dutch conceded it as Portuguese territory. See Heyman 1895:33.
23 Lieutenant Commanding at Coupang, C.W. Knibbe, to Civil Commissioner at Makassar, 
Richard Phillips, 6 June 1812, in Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, Algemeene Secreta-
rie, Arsip Timor, 1616-1890, no. 21.
24 People from the nearby island of Sabu had been living in and near Kupang since the earliest 
days of Dutch settlement. At another time during the British occupation a flotilla of Sabunese ar-
rived in Timor. It was learnt that they had come to do battle for one of the local rajas, an apparent-
ly common practice. Their headman was asked to keep the peace with the Europeans. He replied 
that if one of his subjects harmed any of the British he would lop off his head, and he expected 
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(1852:222) tells a similar tale of Knibbe being pelted with stones by ‘natives’ 
and being forced to flee, although he gives no reason for the event.
According to Heijmering (1847:211-2), Knibbe requested to be replaced 
not long after his arrival in Kupang, but had to wait nearly a year for his 
replacement to arrive. The new resident, a British officer named Watson, was 
in Kupang for a year also, but little more is known of him other than that he 
was remembered as a person of moderate and honest character. In early 1814 
Watson was replaced by a civil official, Mr Burn, who arrived from Makassar 
with his secretary, Mr Curtois.
Heijmering’s chronology of the Timor residents is in conflict with a record 
left by John Clunies Ross, who visited Kupang in May 1813. Clunies Ross was 
third mate and harpooner on the whaling ship Baroness Longueville that put in 
to Kupang for water and provisions prior to sailing for London. Clunies Ross 
recorded in his journal that he was approached by ‘the Resident Mr Joseph 
Burn’ to take command of the chartered brig Olivia, at rest in Kupang harbour 
without a captain. Clunies Ross accepted the job.25 In B.’s account (1852:222), 
Knibbe was replaced by Watson in 1812, and in the same year he was replaced 
by Burn, thus allowing him to meet Clunies Ross in Kupang in 1813. Watson, 
therefore, must have been stationed in Kupang for only a brief period, which 
would explain why so little is known about him.
The Baroness Longueville was not the only British whaling vessel to enter 
Timor’s waters. Indeed, well before the British occupation, in 1808, the 
retiring Netherlands Indies Governor-General, A.H. Wiese (1888:298), in a 
memorandum to his successor, Daendels, warned that Timor was ‘continu-
ously cruised by armed English fishing vessels’. American whalers operating 
near Timor had also been a cause of concern for the Dutch, mainly because 
of apprehension that they were occupied in smuggling (Parkinson 1954:46). 
Under the British, Kupang became an important port for ships involved in the 
South Seas fisheries and for ships returning to Britain from the young colony 
on Australia’s east coast.26
Heijmering is the main source of information for the remaining period of 
British rule in Timor. It is from Heijmering that we know that Hazaart, in the 
meantime, had resorted to his old profession of merchant. But he continued 
to live in Kupang and was of invaluable service in giving advice to the British 
administrators, especially in their dealings with the native population, of 
whom they knew practically nothing. This was certainly true of Burn, who 
the same of the British. He invited the British to visit Sabu, but stressed that they would be guests 
only. The British found the man to be very forthright and dignified. See W. Colebroke, ‘Sketches’, 
Sourabaya [Surabaya], 4 May 1812, Mss Eur Mack Private 82, in British Library, London.
25 Gibson-Hill 1952:17-9. ‘Extract from a journal kept by John Clunies Ross’, 1813, Mss Eur 
K232-46, in British Library, London.
26 Kruseman 1836:4. Timor was to become an important source of supplies for the settlements 
later founded in northern Australia as well. See Farram 2000.
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was reportedly an alcoholic who inspired little respect for his authority in 
the native population. Burn could well have fallen victim to attacks on the 
European administration planned by some local native leaders if Hazaart had 
not got to hear of them first (Heijmering 1847:213).
The first of these was planned by a man called Soroe, a rebellious official 
of the princedom of Dengka on the nearby island of Rote. To maintain the 
peace in Dengka, Soroe was kept in exile in Kupang. Soroe then plotted to 
massacre all the Europeans in the settlement with the aid of the government’s 
slaves and the Rotenese and Sabunese population. A time was set for the mas-
sacre and it might have succeeded if one of the slaves, Poti, had not informed 
Hazaart. Soroe was promptly arrested and the plot collapsed. Poti was given 
his freedom as a reward (Heijmering 1847:213-4).
At about the same time, the raja of Amabi invited Burn, his officials, and 
other dignitaries to a great feast. Hazaart was secretly informed that this was 
a trap and the men would be slaughtered. Amabi, however, was considered 
one of the most loyal allies of the Dutch in Timor and Hazaart doubted the 
veracity of the report. Burn was not convinced and wished to avoid the feast, 
but was finally persuaded by Hazaart, who devised a plan that would thwart 
any attack, raise the respect of the Timorese for the European administration, 
and honour the raja of Amabi at the same time. Hazaart did this by having 
the gentlemen’s servants armed and placed behind their seats at the feast. 
Soldiers with loaded rifles stood behind them. The procession of civil admin-
istrators, armed servants, and soldiers that arrived in Amabi for the feast was 
certainly impressive and was presented as an honour to the host. The raja 
seemed pleased. No attack occurred and the Timorese at large were given a 
demonstration of military might and preparedness (Heijmering 1847:214-6).
The greatest threat to the European administrators was seen as coming 
from the princedom of Amanuban, which abutted Amabi. Amanuban had 
long been in dispute with Kupang. In 1788 the reigning raja of Amanuban 
was forced off the throne by his brother and took refuge in Kupang. The 
usurper, Don Louis, demanded the surrender of the raja’s followers who 
had loyally followed him to Kupang, and declared that he would lop off the 
raja’s head in view of the Europeans (Heijmering 1847:216). Don Louis was 
considered by Hazaart to be ‘very dangerous’, and one of his complaints 
against the treacherous Sergeant-Major Euvard was that he had been in ‘very 
frequent correspondence’ with him.27 The matter came to a head in 1814 when 
an impressive armed force marched from Amanuban into Amabi. The admin-
istration had to respond, and in late 1814 an expedition was prepared using 
whatever material was at hand, which included making cartridges from the 
government archives (to the regret of future historians) (Veth 1855:57).
27 J. Hazaart to Governor General and Council of the Government of the Possessions of his Majesty 
the King of Holland in India, 15 May 1811, Mss Eur Mack Private 29, in British Library, London.
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Secretary Curtois led the expedition, accompanied by Hazaart, but the 
results were inconclusive. Burn died suddenly in Kupang and Curtois was 
recalled to assume leadership of the settlement. The rainy season was then at 
hand and the native soldiers had to be released to attend their cornfields. The 
Amanuban warriors, however, had for the moment been sufficiently awed by 
the field exercise to retreat into their own district, and for this the Europeans 
were thankful (Heijmering 1847:217). Hazaart was involved in a number of 
inconclusive campaigns against Amanuban in the years that followed.
Hazaart reinstated as resident
Curtois had taken the reins of government for only a short period28 before he 
died also. There was then not a single Briton of sufficient ability in Kupang 
to assume leadership, so the principal inhabitants and local rajas requested 
Hazaart to once again fill that role. The British administration in Makassar 
then either officially recognized Hazaart in the post, or silently condoned it. 
Certainly, it seems no one else was appointed to the position. Thus, when the 
Napoleonic wars in Europe were over and the British returned the posts in the 
archipelago to the Dutch, a most unusual event occurred in Timor. In late 1816 
a British officer, Lieutenant Philipps, arrived in Kupang to hand over British 
authority to the new Dutch official, Jacobus Arnoldus Hazaart. Hazaart then 
had the distinction of having twice replaced himself as head of the settlement 
and having served in that position twice for the British (1812 and 1814-1816) 
and twice for the Dutch (1810-1812 and late 1816 onwards).29
The remaining years of Hazaart as resident
One of Hazaart’s first acts after resuming the post of Dutch resident was to 
induce the ruler of Soetrana (Citrana), on the border of the Portuguese en-
clave Oecusse, to switch his allegiance to the Dutch in 1817. The Dutch claim 
was dropped only many years after Hazaart’s death. Hazaart also took action 
against Portuguese incursions on Dutch territory. Hazaart discovered that 
during the British interregnum the Portuguese had planted their flag and be-
gan collecting taxes in the Dutch-claimed port of Atapupu, close to the present 
central border in Timor. Therefore, Hazaart reoccupied the settlement for the 
28 Forty days, according to B. (1852:224).
29 Heijmering 1847:217-9; Kemp 1917:3. The British sold to the Netherlands government all the 
public property they had taken over during their administration. Philipps sold Hazaart a number 
of government slaves whom he claimed were too ‘old and helpless’ to be emancipated. This act 
was disallowed by Philipps’s superiors, who refused to accept the money and requested for the 
slaves to be kept in government employ as ‘free servants’. This was done. See Kemp 1917:3.
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Dutch in 1818, but the Portuguese complained to Batavia, resulting in Hazaart 
standing down while the matter was investigated. Hazaart was reinstated, 
however, when it was concluded that his actions were completely justified. 
The Portuguese then let the matter drop (Heyman 1895:14-8). This was just 
one of a number of disputes between the two colonial powers in Timor which 
provided impetus for a formal settlement of their possessions on the island, 
although this was still many years away.30
Hazaart had two other problems: unrest on the nearby island of Rote, and 
a lack of security for Kupang, which was surrounded by large uninhabited 
areas. Hazaart solved these problems by transferring the restive Rotenese to 
the plains near Kupang. Sabunese immigrants settled here also, although on 
a much smaller scale. These people established successful agricultural com-
munities that provided a buffer for Kupang against raids from the interior. 
The settlers also provided a ready source of soldiers to meet any challenge 
from Timorese princedoms that still opposed the Dutch.31 Hazaart used sol-
diers from this source in a large expedition against Amanuban that he led in 
1822 (Fox 1977:139). According to Heijmering (1847:224), the outcomes of that 
expedition were even less favourable than those of 1814.
Hazaart was keen to improve agricultural production on Timor. He had 
sought to have Javanese wet-rice farmers brought to the island and had 
even established an agricultural association, an usual innovation for that 
period (Ormeling 1956:125; Fox 1977:141-2). Hazaart was also involved in 
public works programmes, such as road building, and did his best to pro-
mote Christianity in the region. With the help of some willing native rulers, 
and with substantial monetary contributions from himself and his former 
secretary, J.M. Tielman, a new church was completed in Kupang in 1826 
(Heijmering 1847:228-30). Tielman and Hazaart also provided hospitality 
to passing explorers, such as the Frenchman Louis de Freycinet, who vis-
ited Kupang in 1818 when Hazaart was up-country campaigning against 
Amanuban, and the British Phillip Parker King, who was in Kupang a few 
months earlier. King was particularly grateful to Hazaart for giving him cash 
on a private bill, without which he would have been unable to purchase pro-
visions (Basset 1962:96-7; King 1969:126-7).
Hazaart remained as resident for many years to follow, but there are few 
further details available of either his personal or professional life. He appears 
to have retired in 1833, or perhaps a bit later (Kemp 1917:198). Heijmering 
30 For details of the partition of Timor, see Farram 1999.
31 Fox 1977:138-48. Rotenese farmers eventually spread throughout much of the interior. 
Because the Rotenese took readily to western education and generally accepted Christianity, they 
in many ways became the favoured people of the Dutch in Timor and were heavily utilized 
in the administrative bureaucracy. The Rotenese on Timor are still active today in agriculture, 
government and politics.
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(1847:230) provides the last glimpse of Hazaart, reporting that he continued 
to work on behalf of the government and the people of the region until his 
very last days. In 1838 he had gone to the island of Sumba on behalf of the 
government to investigate some disputes between local rulers. On his return 
journey he stopped at Sabu and died there on 19 December 1838. 
Conclusion
Much of what we know about Jacobus Arnoldus Hazaart is due to the work 
of G. Heijmering. His 1847 article has informed most work about Hazaart that 
has been written since. The present paper is no exception, but by drawing on 
a range of other sources I have attempted to give a fuller picture of the life and 
times of a quite extraordinary figure. He played a central role in the adminis-
tration of Timor during the British interregnum, and for many years after that. 
When Hazaart died he was in his sixty-fifth year and had spent nearly thirty 
years in the service of the Netherlands government and the people of Timor. 
His length of tenure as resident of Timor was a feat unprecedented at the time 
and unequalled since. 
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